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I. INTRODUCTION
Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, and Bolivia are the five most frequent respondents in investment arbitration in Latin America. 1 Of these, the first four are also the countries that have faced the most arbitration proceedings in the world. 2 Argentina holds the sad privilege of heading this list with more than 50 investment claims initiated against it, 3 a number corresponding to one tenth of all known claims in the history of investment arbitration. 4 And while recently the * The author is a postdoctoral fellow at Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II. She may be contacted at cathy_titi@hotmail.com. The author wishes to thank Christoph Schreuer for his helpful comments. 1 number of registered cases against Argentina has dropped significantly, 5 Venezuela has started to figure as respondent in the largest number of disputes. 6 In 2008, more than half of all registered claims at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) were pending against Latin American countries. 7 In 2012, around one quarter of new ICSID disputes involved a Latin American state. 8 It is then little wonder that Latin America should be questioning itshistorically ambivalent -relationship with investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
It is a truism that, in the aftermath of the first Argentine crisis cases, some Latin American countries started to reconsider the necessity of concluding, or retaining, investment treaties and offering access to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. 9 But the habitual description of the Latin American take on arbitration as one of hostility fails to capture the complexity and fine nuances of this relationship between Latin America and the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. 10 To take an illustration, Mexico has been a party to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since 1992; 11 and, despite the 21 known investment treaty claims against it, 12 it is currently taking part in the negotiations on theaccess to investor-state arbitration in its future international investment treaties. 16 The new Australian Government may, however, abandon this inflexible approach. 17 At the same time, the majority of Latin American investment agreements still provide for some form of international dispute settlement. 18 Complex questions rarely receive uniform or uncontested answers and the discussion of whether Latin America is hostile to arbitration falls squarely within this category. The present contribution starts from the premise that the term 'hostility' is a misnomer and a one-size-fits-all judgment not necessarily borne out by fact. But more than offering a definitive view on whether Latin America is hostile to investment arbitration, the purpose of this article is to question some received ideas about the Latin American approach -or approaches -to investorstate dispute settlement. To do this, it will start with a tour d'horizon of the context, including the history of arbitration in Latin America and recent developments that have sparked talk of 'hostility'. It will then canvass the particular issue of award enforcement, examining Argentina's interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention, and responses to purported failures to enforce investment awards. In a following step, the article will explore the new regionalism in the form of the proposed Latin American dispute resolution center, and it will eventually address the question of the public interest in Latin American arbitration. The final section will conclude.
II. LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN CONTEXT (a) Historical Overview
Traditionally, Latin America has been associated with the Calvo doctrine. 19 Expounded on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality and that of equal treatment between foreigners and nationals, 20 See also supra on denunciations of the ICSID Convention. resolved through the application of local laws by domestic courts and it enjoins investors to renounce applying to their home government for diplomatic protection, 21 at least until available local remedies have been exhausted. 22 Latin America's dalliance with the Calvo doctrine predates the advent of the modern bilateral investment treaty (BIT) world, 23 and it came about as a result of a preoccupation with the use and abuse of diplomatic protection as a means of foreign intervention in domestic affairs. 24 As an expression of this doctrine, a particular type of provision was elaborated and inserted in most state contracts in Latin America: 25 the so-called 'Calvo clause'. The clause specified that disputes are to be settled by domestic courts, that the applicable law is the domestic law of the host state and that the investor may not apply to its home government for diplomatic protection. 26 Some countries, such as Peru, created a constitutional requirement to include a Calvo clause in all public contracts with foreigners. 27 29 In accordance with the tenets of the Calvo doctrine, the initial approach of Latin American countries to arbitration, and, more particularly, to the ICSID Convention was one of skepticism or hostility. 30 51 In the month that followed, Ecuador notified ICSID, in accordance with Article 25(4) ICSID Convention, 52 that it withdrew its consent to arbitration for disputes concerning the treatment of investment arising from economic activities that relate to the exploitation of natural resources, namely oil, gas and minerals. 53 The effect of such a notification is highly disputed. 54 . 55 Yet, in this case, the dilemma proved of little significance: in July 2009, Ecuador became the second country to denounce the ICSID Convention. 56 In January 2012, Venezuela followed suit. 57 Other discussed denunciations, including those of the ALBA parties, have not taken place. For instance, despite an announcement in April 2008 that Nicaragua was considering withdrawing from ICSID, the state remains to this date party to the Convention. 58 More recently, speculation started on whether Argentina was about to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. 59 A Draft Bill from March 2012 60 and ensuing public statements by Eduardo Barcesat, chief legal advisor to Argentina's Treasury, 61 triggered this talk of an imminent withdrawal, but here again no such step has been taken so far.
Withdrawal from the ICSID Convention is one of the most widely-canvassed tokens of Latin America's skepticism towards ISDS. 62 In the political sphere, denunciation of the ICSID Convention may function as a statement of censure towards the international system of investment protection. 63 But it is also possible that such a decision simply evinces a rejection of one particular institution that 55 Emmanuel Gaillard (2008) , supra.
56
belongs to the World Bank. 64 In the legal domain, the impact of a denunciation is more uncertain. Certainly, it imposes limitations on a distinctive feature of international investment law, which is encouragement of forum shopping, 65 but it does not close the door to investment arbitration, at least not to the extent that the applicable investment treaty provides access to other arbitration fora. 66 As an illustration, bilateral investment treaties concluded by Bolivia generally also provide access to the ICSID Additional Facility, 67 UNCITRAL arbitration, 68 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 69 or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). 70 Concrete problems arise only for treaties that, such as the 1994 Bolivia-Chile BIT, do not provide access to another international dispute resolution mechanism. 71 In any case, denunciation of the ICSID Convention leaves open a number of complex questions, including whether consent to arbitrate in an investment treaty remains valid notwithstanding the denunciation, whether the nature of consent or a 'standing offer' to arbitrate differs from treaty to treaty, depending on each instrument's specific language, and who 'holds' the right to arbitrate given that while the treaty is concluded between states, it confers rights on individuals. 72 See http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_ecuador.pdf.
(ii) Terminations of Bilateral Investment Treaties
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American countries. 74 Following jurisprudence of that state's Constitutional Court deeming a number of arbitration clauses in Ecuadorian BITs unconstitutional, 75 Ecuador has further attempted to withdraw from other BITs, including those with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and it has terminated its BIT with Finland. 76 More recently the focus has turned to the uncertain fate of another eight bilateral investment treaties, among which those with Argentina, Bolivia and the United States. 77 Other denounced Latin American investment treaties include the BITs between Bolivia and the United States, 78 El Salvador and Nicaragua, 79 and the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT. 80 According to some reports, Argentina may also be considering whether to terminate its BITs. 81 However, it is probable that Argentina will eventually decide to renegotiate its bilateral investment treaties in order to bring them in line with new generation agreements, rather than follow Ecuador's example in denouncing them. 82 Renegotiation is also a policy that may be adopted by Bolivia, at least in part, given a 'transitory disposition' in the latter's 2009 Constitution, pursuant to which, within four years of the election of 'the new Executive Organ, the Executive shall renounce and, in that case, renegotiate the international treaties that may be contrary to the Constitution'. 83 In accordance with this provision, the Bolivian Government has already announced its intention to renegotiate a number of agreements. 84 By way of a closing remark, it should be observed that Latin American states are not the only ones to terminate bilateral investment treaties. South Africa offers a 74 See UNCTAD (2010). Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs, supra, p. 1, footnote 3. pertinent illustration in this respect, having started to withdraw from a number of first generation BITs. 85 Although it is beyond the purpose of the present discourse to address the effects of BIT terminations, it should be observed that, while a treaty continues to be effective in relation to investments made prior to the date of its termination by virtue of a survival clause, 86 an investor may offer its consent to arbitration for potential future disputes. 87 The drawback for the investor is that, from the moment consent is perfected, the state will in principle also be in a position to initiate arbitration against it. 88 Finally, even termination of investment treaties does not invalidate rights and consent to arbitration given to investors in other instruments, such as contracts and national legislation. 89 
(iii) Domestic Legislation Inimical to Investment Arbitration
Adoption of domestic legislation inimical to investment protection has been another means of expressing dissatisfaction with the current system of investorstate dispute settlement. In some cases, legislative reforms have directly targeted arbitration. As an illustration, one may look at Ecuador's 2008 constitutional amendments. 90 Article 422 of that Constitution provides that:
Treaties or international instruments where the Ecuadorian State yields its sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration entities in disputes involving contracts or trade between the State and natural persons or legal entities cannot be entered into. 91 An exception to this rule in the same article establishes that 'treaties and international instruments that provide for the settlement of disputes between States and citizens in Latin America by regional arbitration entities or by jurisdictional organizations designated by the signatory countries are exempt from this prohibition'. 92 The first part of this clause appears to account for the Latin American dispute settlement center initially proposed by Ecuador, which will be discussed below, 93 while the reference to 'jurisdictional organizations' broadens considerably the scope of the exception.
Likewise, Bolivia's 2009 Constitution, which has already been invoked to explain the country's denunciation of the ICSID Convention, 94 adopts a hostile approach to investment arbitration. Article 320 of that Constitution provides that 'foreign investment shall submit to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities'. Article 366 in its turn establishes that foreign investors operating in the hydrocarbons' production chain:
shall submit to the sovereignty of the State, and to the laws and authority of the State. No foreign court case or foreign jurisdiction shall be recognized, and they may not invoke any exceptional situation for international arbitration, nor appeal to diplomatic claims.
This latter article appears an attempt to avert arbitration claims arising out of Bolivia's nationalization policies affecting the hydrocarbons sector. 95 It has cogently been argued that arbitral tribunals sitting in some neutral place are unlikely to give effect to such limitations when confronted with an arbitration agreement in a treaty or contract. 96 At the same time, in parallel with these constitutional stipulations, statutory laws expressly recognize the right of the parties to submit especially commercial disputes to arbitration. 97 Despite some uncertainty as to whether such provisions are, in fact, contrary to the Constitution, public procurement regulations continue to authorize contracts to give access to international arbitration when necessary for the purchase of goods or services outside Bolivia. 
III. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS RENDERED AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Beyond these developments that demonstrate some Latin American countries' opposition to arbitration, other recent goings-on are more difficult to appraise. Award enforcement has been one of the most crucial issues that have arisen in this respect, affecting in particular Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador. Two topics will be discussed in this context: first, Argentina's interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention and, second, policy responses to purported failures to enforce arbitral awards. that, even when finding in their favour, may have failed to result in prompt compensation. 104 The key question is whether Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention are independent of one another, the former regarding compliance and the latter enforcement of an award that has not been complied with, or whether the two provisions are to be read in conjunction. According to the dominant view, the two articles need to be interpreted separately; according to Argentina, they need to be read together. 105 It is this argument that will be examined here.
Article 53 ICSID Convention provides in its first paragraph that:
The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.
And Article 54(1) ICSID Convention states, inter alia, that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
Article 53 ICSID Convention describes the binding character of the award on the parties to the dispute, while Article 54 ICSID Convention refers to the recognition and enforcement of the award in the territory of each contracting state. 106 That much is clear but it does not necessarily prejudge whether the two articles are to be read together. According to Aron Broches, former General Counsel of the World Bank and 'principal architect' of the ICSID Convention, 107 Article 53 affirms the binding character of the award at the international law level, while Article 54 confirms its finality vis-à-vis domestic courts. 108 This view is also not very helpful in terms of determining the relationship between the two articles, although in one case it has been cited in order to support the view that Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention are to be interpreted together as two sides of one and the same coin. 109 According to the mainstream approach, the parties' obligation to comply with the award, as enshrined in Article 53 ICSID Convention, is 'independent of any enforcement proceedings' under Article 54 ICSID Convention. 110 'to abide by and comply with the terms of the Award, without the need for action on the part of the Claimants pursuant to the enforcement machinery' referred to in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 111 In other words, 'an award debtor may not insist on the initiation of enforcement proceedings to delay compliance. The need for enforcement measures under Art. 54 implies default and hence a breach of Art. 53'. 112 This statement appears to indirectly address Argentina's reading of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention. However, according to a different remark, the obligations under Articles 53 and 54 'arise as soon as the award is rendered'. 113 It is also submitted that the impossibility of enforcing an award under the ICSID Convention as a consequence of the law governing the execution of domestic judgments does not affect the obligation of the party to the arbitration to comply with the award by virtue of Article 53. 114 If one abides by this first view, then Argentina could be in breach of Article 53 ICSID Convention but not Article 54 ICSID Convention. In other words, Argentina has not stricto sensu been responsible for failing to enforce an award, only for failing to comply with it.
In line with the second view -this is the view endorsed by Argentina 115 Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention complement each other. 116 Article 54 ICSID Convention is applicable from the moment the award is rendered and not only once the state has failed to pay in accordance with Article 53 ICSID Convention. 117 As a corollary, the obligation to equate ICSID awards to final judgments of local courts in Article 54 ICSID Convention for purposes of recognition and enforcement is immediately effective and it is interpreted not to 'negate or condition in any way the binding and final nature of ICSID awards'. 118 The determination of whether Argentina failed to comply with the awards depends on which of the two interpretations is adopted. If a combined interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention is accepted, then some further considerations become pertinent. Article 54 ICSID Convention makes clear that a state may not rely on defences such as those of the New York 111 Convention to deny enforcement. 119 However, on the basis of the same article, the state is entitled to subject enforcement of the award to the procedures applicable to enforcement of a final judgment of its local courts. 120 This is understood to introduce treatment not less favourable than the one applicable to final judgments of domestic courts. 121 Accordingly, the contracting states are not required to 'undertake forced execution of awards rendered pursuant to the Convention in cases in which final judgments could not be executed'. 122 It has also been suggested that the obligation 'to equate awards to final judgments of local courts for purposes of recognition and enforcement cannot be construed in a way that accepts some of its consequences, such as the impermissibility [of invoking] certain defences to deny execution, and discard other consequences, such as equal treatment between ICSID awards and final local judgments'. 123 The state parties to the ICSID Convention have an 'obligation to give effect to Article 54 of the Convention in their internal law. Exactly how this is done depends on the constitutional arrangements of the State Party concerned'. 124 Like other countries, for the purposes of Article 54 ICSID Convention, Argentina has designated a court. 125 The relevant procedure to be followed in order to obtain enforcement is often described in laws enacted to implement the ICSID Convention; for instance, in the United Kingdom the procedure is laid out in the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act of 1966. 126 Similar provisions have been adopted by Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 127 In Argentina, which has a monist legal system and therefore no implementing act was required, 128 the relevant law is contained in the Federal Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. 129 Since the provisions of the Code were not set in place to address ICSID arbitration in particular, they encompass rules that may be inapplicable in casu. For instance, the Code provides grounds on which the state may deny enforcement, such as reasons of public policy. 130 In this respect, it must be noted that, in the Argentine legal system, international treaties are above national statutes; 131 in other words, should there be a conflict between the ICSID Convention and the procedure required by the Code, it will be the former that prevails.
Argentina's interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention, translated into a discussion around compliance and enforcement, has met with criticism in the literature, 132 and it appears to raise systemic issues, 133 notably since it affects one of the ICSID Convention's distinctive features, which is award enforcement. 134 If the combined reading of Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention is not accepted and, therefore, Argentina should have spontaneously paid the awards, the question is asked whether there was bad faith on its part in not complying with them. In other words, is the fact that it was in Argentina's interests to delay payment of the awards a sufficient determinant of bad faith? Bad faith or its absence would have been relatively easy to determine if the beneficiaries of the non-paid awards had attempted to observe the procedure suggested by Argentina. If payment had not then been obtained, bad faith would have been established. However, Argentina's entire 'defence' has been buttressed on an understanding that it was in compliance with its obligations assumed under the ICSID Convention and that, if the awards had not been paid, this is because their owners had not complied with the 'local administrative procedures'. 135 In this light, there is good reason to assume that, were these procedures respected, Argentina would have paid. No such step was taken by the award beneficiaries. 136 Assistance was sought instead through 'diplomatic' or political channels, and this is the topic that will be considered in the ensuing section. 130 Article 519bis in conjunction with Article 517(4) Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nación. 
(b) Policy Responses to Purported Failures to Enforce Arbitral Awards
In accordance with Articles 27(1) and 64 ICSID Convention, 137 where a state fails to comply with an arbitral award the possibility opens up for a politicization of the dispute through diplomatic protection or through the institution of 'an international claim'. A traditional form of diplomatic protection is, of course, recourse to the International Court of Justice 138 and Argentina, which contended that it was not in violation of the ICSID Convention, had indicated that it was 'prepared to submit the issue' to the ICJ. 139 Milder forms of 'diplomatic protection' may be exercised through the World Trade Organization (WTO); this has been recently witnessed in contexts unrelated to award enforcement, namely, in Repsol's nationalization 140 and the adoption of Australia's tobacco plain packaging legislation. 141 The beneficiaries of non-paid awards may also put pressure on their governments to use leverage at international financial institutions, notably at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 142 This is a step that has been employed in the Argentine cases. compliance with . . . ICSID . . . rulings'. 143 It has also been suggested that the United States oppose Argentina's request to restructure its outstanding Paris Club debt, 144 which currently stands at USD 6.5 billion. 145 Sometime later, the United States voted against the extension of some World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans to Argentina, 146 a move emulated at the time by Germany and Spain, and, in 2013, also endorsed by the United Kingdom, although on grounds only remotely, if at all, related to award enforcement. 147 The long-term potential of such negative votes is uncertain at the time of writing. 148 Blocking the disbursement of loans would probably be the most effective method of stepping up pressure; but it is another much less drastic measure, withholding trade benefits, that has attracted attention in relation to the Argentine crisis disputes. 149 In March 2012, the United States suspended Argentina's designation as a beneficiary country of the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 150 Generalized Systems of Preferences find their legal basis in the WTO's Enabling Clause (officially 'Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries') 151 and they are offered by a number of developed economies, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and, as mentioned, the United States. 152 The purpose of these programs is to allow developing countries to benefit from non-reciprocal preferential (zero or low) tariff rates without an 143 Letter from Mark Kirk, US Senator, to Timothy Geithner, 21 June 2011 http://embassyofargentina.us/ embassyofargentina.us/files/letterambchiaradiatotimothyf.pdf. See Argentina surprised by Germany, which voted against granting a loan at the IDB, MercoPress, 31 August 2012 en.mercopress.com/2012/08/31/argentina-surprised-by-germany-which-voted-against-granting-aloan-at-the-idb; UK will block IADB and World bank loans to Argentina because of financial 'misconduct', MercoPress, 14 February 2013 http://en.mercopress.com/2013/02/14/uk-will-block-iadb-and-world-bankloans-to-argentina-because-of-financial-misconduct and UK confirms policy of no support for World Bank and IADB loans to Argentina, MercoPress, 13 July 2013 http://en.mercopress.com/2013/07/13/ukconfirms-policy-of-no-support-for-world-bank-and-iadb-loans-to-argentina. See also HM Government Epetition, Stop British taxpayers' money supporting World Bank loans to Argentina epetitions.direct.gov.uk/ petitions/34551. obligation to extend the same privileges to developed economies. 153 The United States' Generalized System of Preferences, in particular, is designed to encourage economic growth in developing economies by granting preferential duty-free treatment for up to 5,000 products exported to the United States from the beneficiary countries. 154 Given the discretionary nature of GSP schemes, granting of benefits is generally subject to performance obligations, 155 one of which in the US Generalized System of Preferences program is that beneficiary states must 'act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards'. 156 The suspension of Argentina's benefits under the US Generalized System of Preferences program came as a result of petitions in relation to Argentina's alleged failure to comply with the Azurix and CMS Awards. 157 The petitions were submitted by Azurix Corporation and Blue Ridge Investments (the latter having purchased the CMS Award). 158 The US Government determined that Argentina had 'not acted in good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or association that is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens', 159 which occasioned the first ever suspension of the application of the US GSP program for non-payment of an arbitral award. 160 It is of interest to note that the terminology employed in the above statement, as in the underlying law, 161 jars with the earlier assumption that, in accordance with the dominant interpretation, Argentina has failed to comply with the awards but it has not failed to enforce them. 162 This serves to stress the fluidity of the two concepts and the possible absence of a clear demarcating line between them. Suspension of its GSP benefits aside, a petition has been deposited against 153 See Enabling Clause for developing countries (goods) at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/ dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm; also Roger P. Alford (2013) , supra, pp. 50-51. Detailed documentation and updates on GSP programs are available through UNCTAD's website at http:// unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/Generalized-System-of-Preferences.aspx. Argentina for trade remedies under section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. 163 The latter broadly concerns cases where foreign trade practices violate trade agreements or unjustifiably impede US commerce, but the United States has appeared unwilling to take any related action. 164 It is unclear whether suspension of its trade benefits was an attempt to convince Argentina to pay the awards in order to be reinstated in the GSP program 165 or whether it was primarily meant as retaliation or a sanction. 166 It must be noted that for Argentina the resulting costs from the suspension of the GSP program in its regard were only a fraction of the amount the country owed in international arbitration. 167 Instead of altering its position in the matter, Argentina has endeavoured to reach post-award settlements with the award beneficiaries, and details of reported deals have recently been reported in the press. 168 These settlements do not compromise Argentina's reading of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention, and they achieve satisfaction at the international level. For the same reasons, politically this may also prove a more convenient approach to adopt.
The suspension of Argentina's trade benefits could also be intended as a warning to third countries that may be considering non-compliance with arbitral awards, given the assumption that other Latin American states could seek to avoid paying arbitral awards in the future. 169 The statement by late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2012, two weeks before Venezuela's denunciation of the ICSID Convention, that the country would not comply with any ICSID awards 170 and Ecuador's stance in the Chevron dispute (see infra) appear to have triggered such considerations. 171 It is remarkable, however, that the US has not suspended GSP benefits of other countries that have previously failed to respect arbitral awards. 172 Following in the steps of Azurix Corporation and Blue Ridge Investments, more recently Chevron has been lobbying the US Trade Representative to suspend 163 19 USC § 2411. 164 Ecuador's beneficiary status under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), in view of the country's conduct in relation to the Chevron case. 173 The Andean Trade Preference Act was enacted in the early 1990s in order to offer reduced-duty or duty-free access to the US market to exports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. 174 Pursuant to Title 19 of the United States Code, ATPA benefits too may be suspended if a beneficiary country 'fails to act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards'. 175 Chevron requested the US Government to allow Ecuador's ATPA benefits to expire, because of the country's 'failure to enforce or recognize arbitral awards under the BIT', unless appropriate steps were taken for their recognition and enforcement. 176 In the two most recent annual reports on the operation of the ATPA, the Office of the US Trade Representative stressed that BIT terminations, withdrawal from the ICSID Convention and Ecuador's conduct in the Chevron dispute raise concerns about the Government's 'long-term commitment to international arbitration for the settlement of investor disputes'. 177 As a consequence, the US 'is monitoring developments in connection with these matters' under the relevant eligibility criteria. 178 The opinion has been expressed that Ecuador is likely to see its trade benefits suspended anyway, 179 given that it figures currently as the program's sole eligible beneficiary. 180 Another issue of consequence is that both the US GSP and ATPA programs have at the time of writing expired and it is unclear whether they will be renewed. 181 The ramifications of a belated renewal are also uncertain. In the past, a lapse in GSP authorization was redressed by retroactively extending the benefits to eligible products that had been imported in the United States between the program's expiration date and that of the entry-into-force of its renewal. At the same time, the United States' re-evaluation or suspension of trade benefits may open the way for other states or economies to follow a similar approach vis-à-vis 'recalcitrant' ICSID members or states that are in noncompliance with their international investment obligations. Already, with respect to the nationalization of Repsol, one month after the announcement of the suspension of Argentina's benefits under the US GSP program, the European Parliament urged the European Commission and the Council to consider and adopt measures required to prevent 'such situations' from 'arising again, including the possible partial suspension of the unilateral tariff preferences under the GSP scheme'. 183 No related action has been taken so far.
The topics of compliance and enforcement will probably continue to animate the debate on Latin American investment arbitration, at least until the beneficiaries of outstanding awards have been satisfied or a solution has been reached at the international level. The suspension of trade benefits as a means of response to purported failures to respect awards may become recurrent and lead to a partial 're-politicisation' of investment disputes. 184 It remains to be seen how these issues will evolve in the time to come.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW REGIONALISM IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: UNASUR NEGOTIATIONS ON A LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION CENTER
An outcome of the dissatisfaction with the current system of international investment arbitration that has found proponents among a number of Latin American states is the proposed establishment of a regional Latin American arbitration center. 185 The creation of this center is the focus of the present section. To support the constitution and implementation of regional organisms for settling investment disputes, to ensure fair and balanced rules when settling disputes between corporations and States. Encourage UNASUR in the approval of a regional mechanism currently under negotiation and promote the inclusion of other Latin American States in this mechanism. 187 The above statement requires some explanation. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), created in 2008 and clustering together Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 188 currently serves as the negotiation forum for a regional dispute settlement body. 189 This body, first proposed by Ecuador as a counterweight to ICSID, 190 would place emphasis, inter alia, on dispute resolution through consultations or mediation and on the transparency of proceedings; 191 it would encompass an appellate mechanism 192 and, similarly to the New York Convention 193 and in contradistinction to the ICSID Convention, 194 the relevant arbitration rules would allow a host state to deny recognition or enforcement of an award, if, according to its laws, the subject-matter of the dispute is nonarbitrable 195 or it is contrary to public policy. 196 At the outset, the arbitration center would be reserved for UNASUR countries, later it would open up to countries in Central America and the Caribbean, and, finally, it would become available to any country that wishes to use it. 197 The aim is to set in place an 'independent' and 'impartial' body, deferent to the sovereignty of UNASUR Member States, and at the same time to take into account the need to encourage investment inflows. 198 The potential and scope of this proposed investor-state arbitration system remains, as of the present time, yet to determine. One final aspect to take into account when evaluating the Latin American approach to arbitration is that the criticism levelled at the latter is linked to cases that involve the public interest. 200 A first example is the Aguas del Tunari, S.A. dispute, 201 which was born out of the privatization of water utilities in Cochabamba, Bolivia. 202 The privatization, which had been encouraged by international financial institutions, 203 resulted in costlier water sources and water treatment systems, which, in their turn, resulted in higher water prices for consumers. 204 While the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that an individual should not be spending in excess of 3% to 5% of his or her income on water in casu households ended up spending more than 20% of their income on water. 205 A few months after the start of the privatization scheme, violent protests erupted, during which more than 100 people were injured and one person was killed. 206 These events marked the onset of what became known as Bolivia's Water War. 207 Following the protests, Bolivia put an end to the privatization concession. 208 The case brought by the investor was eventually settled out of arbitration. Bechtel, the owner of the concession, agreed to withdraw its claim in response to escalating criticism at the international level and in light of 'the civil unrest and the state of emergency'. 209 But the most obvious example of Latin American arbitration involving the public interest is that of the cases that were initiated as a result of Argentina's financial crisis of 2001. The facts are well-known, so only a brief summary will be given here. Argentina's economic recession of the late 1990s significantly deepened in 2001, precipitating an economic and political crisis 210 so severe that it later resulted in violent demonstrations, deaths and a succession of five presidents within a period shorter than two weeks. 211 In an attempt to 'stabilize the economy and 200 restore political confidence', 212 Argentina adopted a broad range of measures. Among these were the freezing of bank accounts to prevent a run on the banks with Decree No. 1570/01, 213 known as the Corralito, 214 and the abandonment of the currency board system that had pegged the Argentinean peso to the US dollar with the Emergency Law of January 2002. 215 As already mentioned, these measures created a wave of disputes, the most impressive in the history of investment arbitration. 216 But apart from their sheer number and the political and financial implications for any respondent of having to defend such a large caseload, 217 a number of the awards delivered against Argentina have proved controversial and several of them have been annulled. 218 Notably, some awards were found to contain errors of law 219 and annulment committees concluded that the tribunals had entirely failed to apply the applicable law. 220 It is beyond the purpose of the present to canvass the controversies of these cases. Another aspect needs to be emphasized here, to wit, that these awards directly involved the public interest: they pronounced on Argentina's economic policies -especially when tribunals examined whether the state had contributed to the crisis 221 -and, in doing so, manifested variable degrees of deference to the general interest at stake. An illustrative example is offered by the tribunals' appreciation of the gravity of Argentina's predicament. While some tribunals considered that the crisis was of sufficient magnitude to render necessary the 222 and that Argentina faced 'an extremely serious threat' to 'its existence, its political and economic survival' and 'the preservation of its internal peace', 223 others required 'total economic and social collapse' 224 or a situation that 'compromised the very existence of the State and its independence', 225 and remained unconvinced that the severity of the crisis at hand crossed that threshold. 226 It is not unusual that a tribunal rules upon public policy decisions of a quasiconstitutional nature. 227 With the Argentine crisis disputes it became clear that what effectively has been under review is Argentina's response to a major economic crisis, leading arbitral control to the heart of governmental policy. 228 This observation raises the question of where lies the dividing line 'between judging a State's policies and judging the consequences of such policies' for investors. 229 The measures Argentina adopted were based on the assumption that its essential security interests and public order were at stake, 230 an argument accepted by some tribunals but rejected by others. 231 The opinion has been expressed that it is questionable whether the subjective interests of a state that perceives its security to be at stake are susceptible of objective evaluation and whether 'any tribunal acting judicially can override the assertion of a State that a dispute affects its security or vital interests'. 232 In this light, the vehemence of Argentina's defence strategy is hardly surprising.
Beyond the initial crisis awards, more recently a new type of dispute has confronted Argentina, in the form of the Abaclat case, this time arising directly out of the country's sovereign debt restructuring. 233 In determining that it has the right to hear the dispute, the tribunal's Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility marks a controversial approach to at least two issues, namely, the question of whether security entitlements in government bonds constitute investment and, more contestably, whether mass claims are allowed under the ICSID 222 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra, para. 226.
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Convention. 234 Abaclat and its (potential) successors 235 may contribute to further raising skepticism as to states' consent to arbitration.
By their nature arbitral awards are susceptible to bear on issues that relate to the public interest. This in itself should not be an issue. Nonetheless, taking into account the nature of arbitrations that have involved Latin American countries helps better illustrate the circumstances under which any mistrust on their part of the dispute settlement system has come about. These disputes also appear to have rekindled a rhetoric of sovereignty. As already mentioned, negotiations on the Latin American arbitration center under the auspices of UNASUR aim to create a body respectful of state sovereignty 236 and, according to one extreme public statement, bilateral investment treaties are 'null and void' because they have entailed an abandonment of Latin American countries' 'legislative and jurisdictional sovereignty'. 237 It is likely that this talk of sovereignty is only another way of expressing sensitivity to the public interest and the fact that the latter has not always been sufficiently taken into account.
VI. CONCLUSION
Developments in Latin America are only a symptom of a wider re-thinking of standards of investment protection across the globe and the new tendency towards more flexible and balanced investment agreements. 238 If the questioning of the system seems to take place more acutely in this part of the world, it may be due to the type of disputes that have been registered. However, to confine this phenomenon to Latin America fails to reflect reality. Denouncing the ICSID Convention is more a political statement than an actual rejection of investment 234 arbitration. If some investors protected under Bolivian BITs are unable to bring a dispute before an ICSID tribunal, this is not different to the situation facing NAFTA investors and investors bringing claims against the European Union in the near future. 239 If Argentina decides to include an expressly self-judging essential security interests exception in its future treaties, 240 the United States adopted this approach back in the 1990s. 241 All 'options' considered in this article other than BIT terminations are more conventional and less radical than Australia's (potential) wholesale rejection of investor-state dispute settlement.
It must be stressed that the present contribution has centered on investment arbitration and that the popularity of commercial arbitration follows a different trajectory. 242 According to the ICC, which administers predominantly commercial dispute settlement, participation of Latin American parties has been on the rise, 243 with 11% of parties in 2012 case filings, viz. 224 parties, coming from Latin America. 244 Finally, the professed skepticism of some states to investment arbitration does not translate into a single Latin American approach. 245 If some countries in the region are considering options beyond the traditional investment dispute settlement mechanisms, others remain faithful to these same mechanisms. 246 This is notably the case of Chile, Mexico, Panama and Peru, 247 which have not been 239 discussed in this article. And even the countries with apparent secessionist tendencies, such as Ecuador, are currently taking part in the negotiations on the creation of the Latin American arbitration center. In this respect, it will be interesting to monitor developments in the immediate and near future. At this stage, the overall Latin American approach does not amount to a rejection of investment arbitration, nor should it necessarily be perceived as particularly hostile to it.
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